[School Transporation Security Awareness Training]

STSA DVD
Leader's Guide (English)

Transportation Security Administration

Table of Contents

"SCHOOL TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AWARENESS"

*DISCUSSION LEADER'S GUIDE for
AUDIO-VISUAL SEGMENT (DVD)*

I.   OVERVIEW

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has created an interactive training program tailored to the various segments of the school bus transportation industry. This program consists of an audio-visual component (on a conventional Digital Video Disc, DVD) and a web-based, Internet component for School/Pupil Transport Operations Management, Maintenance and Bus Driver personnel.

II.   SCOPE

This document describes the audio-visual component of the program, and provides material to guide small-group discussions[1] of the material depicted. The material *(presented in the DVD and in the accompanying discussion)* is intended to significantly increase the school transportation industry's awareness and understanding of the threats, vulnerabilities and possible responses to security incidents that may occur during daily operations; and to communicate security needs, priorities and actions to community leaders, public policy bodies and the general public.

Detailed training information is provided to operational management, maintenance and bus driver populations through the highly interactive, web-based modules accompanying the audio-visual DVD.

III.   AUDIO-VISUAL PRESENTATION SYNOPSIS

The audio-visual DVD is entitled "School Transportation Security Awareness" and it runs uninterrupted for *23* minutes on a conventional DVD player. It consists of eighteen "scenes" that engage the viewer through a realistic depiction of a school bus hijacking. As the tense scenario unfolds the bus driver, maintenance personnel, dispatcher, school administrators and emergency responders are shown taking specific and decisive actions that prevent a catastrophic loss of life and property. A successful outcome dramatically drives home the program's key messages: a) the need for increased awareness by driver, maintenance, operations and management/ administrative personnel, b) the critical importance of pre-trip inspections, c) the need for increased awareness of unusual circumstances/behavior around bus lots or along bus routes, and d) the importance of seamless teamwork by all members of the "defending" community.

There is major emphasis on the *de-facto* team that emerges to detect, analyze and defeat a threat over a very short period of time.

---

[1] Group size ranges from 3 to 20 participants each. For groups with fewer than 3 participants, individual self-study is recommended. See Section VII for lesson plans appropriate to each group size.

IV.   TARGET AUDIENCE

The audio-visual DVD is intended for viewing (and discussion) by the following audiences, either in small groups or in individual self-study:

- ➢ National, state and local public policy officials
- ➢ School officials and School Board members and staff
- ➢ Operations management personnel
- ➢ School administrators, faculty and staff
- ➢ Trainers
- ➢ Bus maintenance personnel (optional, at the discretion of school administration)
- ➢ Bus drivers (optional, at the discretion of school administration)

V.   LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After viewing the audio-visual DVD, participants will be able to:

- ➢ Understand and recognize security vulnerabilities present on public school buses
- ➢ Identify reasonable and responsible protective measures
- ➢ Understand and define the consequences of inaction
- ➢ Recognize the potential for mass casualties
- ➢ Achieve and sustain the capability and the will to take proper action in a crisis
- ➢ Advocate greater security awareness among school transportation personnel
- ➢ Promote implementation of school Security Management plans
- ➢ Recognize and appreciate importance of teamwork among all members of the "defending" community.

If used in a "group discussion" format, group participants will share their observations, conclusions and suggestions with each other. Participants will be encouraged to contribute ideas and potential innovations in both observed and desired behavior responses to the situations shown in the audio-visual presentation. The DVD should be placed on "Pause" at key junctures[2] to allow for such group discussion and analysis. At each designated intervention point, the discussion leader may explore the topics described below.

VI.   DISCUSSION GUIDE

If used in a "group discussion" format, the leader *(or Trainer)* will guide and facilitate the group in a pre-DVD viewing exchange of ideas on the threat to school transport assets (equipment, personnel and facilities), and on the conduct of a vulnerability self-assessment in accord with the guidelines provided in Attachment 2. This will be followed by a viewing of the DVD with discussion breaks at each of the five "pause-points" indicated in Section VI B. below.

At the conclusion of the entire DVD, the discussion leader should "pull it all together" in a summary of major points observed. The leader will go back over the major points made by the group in the pre-viewing threat and vulnerability self-assessment discussions, and correlate the actions depicted in the DVD with these pre-viewing ideas.

---

[2] The DVD contains visual cues to prompt pausing of the video.

Finally, the leader will guide and document a group assessment of the effectiveness of the material presented against each learning objective cited in Section V, above.

VI.1   Pre-Viewing Discussion   (Equal To or Less Than 75 Minutes)

VI.1.a *The Threat*   *(Equal to or less than 30 Minute Discussion)*

All participants will be encouraged to contribute their own perception of the security threat directed at school transportation assets. This will include threats from organized terrorist attacks, criminal threats, student intimidation, vandalism and property destruction directed against equipment (e.g., buses), personnel (e.g., drivers), and/or facilities (e.g., schools, bus stops, storage lots).

The discussion leader should record all ideas on a flip-chart visible to all participants, and should NOT reject any comments made by group members (unless the entire group agrees).

The leader will bring together all threat comments and observations, and compare them to the STSA Project "Threat Baseline" provided in Attachment 1[3]. Any "uncovered" items will be addressed during the post-DVD viewing discussion (see Section C, below).

The group discussion can be expected to produce commentary on threats from:

> a.   Organized Terrorist Attacks
> b.   Criminal Attacks
> c.   Student/Passenger Intimidation
> d.   Vandalism
> e.   Bus Stop Harassment/Vandalism
> f.   Bus Theft/Vandalism at Storage Location

The group discussion can be expected to produce commentary on targets such as:

> a.   Buses and Bus Drivers
> b.   Schools and School Facilities
> c.   Bus Stops
> d.   Bus Passengers
> e.   Bus Destinations (e.g., sport complexes, museums, field trip destinations, etc.)

The leader should record *(e.g. using flip-charts)* any additional items that emerge during the discussion and include them in the final, post-viewing discussion. The leader should prepare to discuss similarities and differences with actions depicted in the DVD presentation.

VI.1.b *Security Preparedness Self-Assessment   (Equal to or less than 45 Minutes)*

The leader should introduce the notion of a security self-assessment and reference the "Self-Assessment Tool" (provided in Attachment 2).

---

[3] Attachment to this document.

The leader should focus on assuring that each participant understands the tool sufficiently well to complete it on his/her own, and to properly understand and interpret the results.

    a.   Overview of Vulnerability Self- Assessment Tool
    b.   Structural "Walk Through" of Tool
    c.   Understanding the Results

{Planned Break-10 Minutes of Personal Time}
Includes Time for Private, Collegial Discussions among Participants

Consolidated
SAFETY
Services, Inc.

STSA-2021-204-05-01
School Transportation Security Awareness Training
23 December 2005

VI.2   Viewing and Discussion   (Equal to or Less Than 70 Minutes)

After completion of the above discussions, the leader should play the DVD. This audio-visual product is of "sports quality", and plays for 23 minutes (un-interrupted wall-clock time). It consists of 18 "scenes" dramatizing a realistic school bus hijacking as a prelude to an attack on a populated school during school hours. These 18 scenes are synopsized below:

VI.2.a *Scene by Scene Overview*

SCENE 1: Bus Parking Lot, Maintenance Garage 4:00 AM

The scene opens at 4:00 AM in a dimly lit school bus parking lot.

Marvin, a rough looking man in dark clothes cuts through the lock & chain that secures a school bus parking lot. Marvin quickly locates bus # 423 and forces open the door of the bus, leaving visible signs of tampering on the bus exterior. He boards the bus and goes to the third row of seats where he places and secures a battery-operated radio frequency (i.e., RF) jamming device under the seat. After completing the installation, he leaves the bus, closing the door behind him. As he shuts the door, he looks around and sees Jim, a maintenance worker for the school system, about 40 yards away walking under a yard light. Jim glances around as he walks, and sees a dark figure (Marvin) but is too far away to challenge him directly. Jim moves slowly and carefully toward the place where he saw Marvin's figure but he does not see Marvin any longer.   Marvin escapes to a waiting car without further challenge or observation. The car, driven by Tina, speeds away.

SCENE 2: Bus Parking Lot; Maintenance Garage   4:10 AM

Jim examines the bus where he first saw Marvin and notices the tamper marks (i.e., scratches) on the bus door. Concerned, he carefully inspects the bus. He checks the radio and notes that it is still in place. He then tours the bus, looking under the seats on each side. He finds the RF radio jammer installed by Marvin, and examines it. Jim doesn't see any evidence of explosive material, or any timing device but he remembers his Security Awareness training received under TSA's STSA program and he does NOT remove (or touch) any part of the jammer package. He does, however, complete inspection of the rest of the bus, including the engine compartment. Jim goes to a telephone and calls Samantha, the maintenance foreperson, to report what happened. Samantha calls the local police and requests an investigation.

Jim returns to Bus # 423 and places an "Out of Service" sign on the windshield. He also locks the bus to prevent accidental entry by anyone.

SCENE 3: Bus Parking Lot, Maintenance Garage   6:30 AM

Charlene, the usual driver of Bus #423, arrives for work. This scene begins to develop Charlene's character as a happy and likable woman, someone the audience connects with.   As Charlene checks-in with Jim to get the keys to Bus 423, Jim recounts his experience earlier in the morning and describes the device (i.e. jammer) that he removed from Bus 423. Jim tells Charlene that Bus # 423 is "quarantined" and gives her the keys to another bus, # 846. Charlene frowns, shrugs and goes to her new bus (# 846). Still disturbed by her conversation with Jim,

Charlene gives her bus a careful inspection, including the full pre-trip inspection. She finds nothing suspicious so she gets inside, starts the engine, and begins her route.

Discussion Break #1   (Optional) for Scenes 1-3

SCENE 4: First Bus Stop,   7:15 AM

Now in bright morning light, Charlene stops the bus at the first pick-up point. Two elementary school–age children board the bus, each carrying backpacks and lunch boxes. They exchange happy greetings with the driver. During this scene and the next, Charlene and the children make small talk, demonstrating their rapport. The children seek out seats near the back of the bus. Before pulling away from the stop, Charlene checks her interior mirrors to make sure the children are safely seated.

SCENE 5: Second Bus Stop,   A Few Minutes Later

As Charlene approaches her second stop she notices two tall men in leather overcoats standing near three children waiting for her bus. The men are conversing with each other but not with any of the children.   Charlene feels slightly uncomfortable with the scene she observes as she approaches the stop. Before opening the door to the bus, she visually checks to be sure her radio and cell phone (equipped with a GPS locator) are both on. Charlene stops the bus about 5 feet short of where the children are waiting (about 8-10 feet short of the men). Charlene opens the door to welcome the children aboard, waving hello to a mother (Mrs. Johnson), who is standing at her front door watching the children board the bus. As the children scramble on-board, the men also move toward the bus. Charlene starts to close the door, but one of the men puts his hand in the door to prevent it from closing. He says that his son has forgotten his lunch, and he forces himself on to the bus. The second man also boards the bus behind the first. The children, who have been talking grow suddenly silent. . Mrs. Johnson observes both the children and the men board the bus but cannot see what is happening inside.

Charlene seems to recognize one of the men, but can't quite place him. A brief flashback depicts Charlene's memory of seeing the same man, about a week ago, standing on this street making notes on a pad while watching the bus.

Quickly, one of the men (Kamil) sits down directly behind Charlene. In one rapid motion, he pulls a knife from his pocket and places it behind Charlene's ear. He tells Charlene to get moving and not make any more stops. Charlene follows instructions, passing several groups of children at their bus stops. He does not seem unduly concerned with Charlene's radio, which sits in plain site. Charlene begins to understand the reason for this "lack of concern". Kamil thinks the radio transmission is being jammed. Her conversation with Jim occurs to Charlene in flash-back.

The second man (Karl) goes all the way back to where the children are huddling, and tells them to be quiet and tries to assure them that they will be fine. He opens his coat to reveal an explosive vest. He positions himself in the bus aisle to prevent any of the children from approaching the front of the bus. Charlene observes all of this in her interior mirror.

SCENE 6:   Bus # 846 Interior, Driving

The first hijacker (near Charlene), Kamil, gives Charlene driving directions to a warehouse area near (i.e., about five blocks from) Charlene's normal route. He tells Charlene to drive to a specific building. Kamil then ducks down in the seat so he cannot be seen by anyone outside of the bus.

The second man (Karl) also takes a seat immediately in front of the first row of seats occupied by the children. He gruffly repeats his warning to the children to "be quiet, and sit still".

Charlene looks in her rear view mirror and tries to make eye contact with each child. She tries to reassure them with a nervous smile, a nod of her head, and a wink. She drives to the address he has been given by Kamil.

Discussion Break # 2 (Optional) for Scenes 4-6

SCENE 7:   School District Dispatch Office

This scene begins with Mrs. Johnson calling the school because she feels uneasy about the mysterious men who got on the bus. Her call is transferred to Jonathan, the dispatcher, who has no explanation. Jonathan assures her that everything is probably fine, but he says that he will investigate. Jonathan quickly checks the maintenance log for Bus # 423 and sees the note filed by Jim about the removal of the jammer earlier that morning, along with the notation assigning the substitute Bus # 846 to Charlene. He becomes immediately suspicious and decides not to try the radio. Instead he calls "911" and files a full report with all of the information he knows, including Charlene's new bus identification (# 846), route and destination.

SCENE 8:   Bus # 846 Interior, Driving

Charlene asks Kamil if she can use the radio to call in and file a report that all is normal *(she tells Kamil that this is a routine procedure, and if she does not report in, it will cause suspicion)*. Kamil fights off a wicked smile, and says OK. Charlene calls the dispatch office on the radio and uses a pre-arranged code-phrase *(e.g., "Tomahawk 2")* indicating that she has been hijacked by 2 armed individuals. The call is routed to Jonathan *(Charlene's assigned dispatcher)* and Jonathan now knows there is real trouble. Quickly, he decides not to transmit anything that might disturb the situation. However, he keeps the line open and calls "911" with an update to his earlier report.

SCENE 9: Dispatch Office & Principal's Office

Two other parents have called the school to report that the Bus missed the normal pick-up for their children. Jonathan now is getting a good picture of what is happening but he does not know the ultimate plans of the hijackers. He notifies his operations manager, who immediately calls the school principal. Mr. Hopkins, the principal, instructs the operations manager to alert local police. Mr. Hopkins, having recently completed School Transportation Awareness Training offered by the Department of Homeland Security's TSA, realizes that the school itself might be the eventual target of the hijacking. He alerts school administration staff to prepare to evacuate all personnel and students to the far end of an adjacent athletic field *(about 300 yards removed from the school structure)*. This is the same evacuation location planned for a fire emergency.

SCENE 10: "Vacant" Warehouse

The bus arrives outside the warehouse that Charlene was directed to drive to by Kamil. As a huge overhead door opens, Kamil tells Charlene to drive inside. Three other terrorists (Marvin, Tina and Candle) meet the bus, opening the rear emergency exit. They off-load all of the children and Tina takes them to an empty "office" adjacent to the warehouse floor. She is instructed by Marvin (the apparent "leader"), to stay with them and keep them "still and quiet". Marvin, Karl and Candle then load large pipe-like explosives into the aisle and set detonators. Kamil observes the "explosive-loading" from inside the bus (at the rear of the bus).

While the hijackers are busy with loading and securing the explosives and detonators, Charlene is able to take her cell phone from her pocket. She dials "911" by pushing a single, pre-programmed button on her phone. She slowly places the phone on the left armrest under some papers and hopes the 911 dispatcher will be able to hear what is happening. She also knows that the built-in GPS tracking feature will silently signal her location.

Kamil returns to his seat behind Charlene. He is the only hijacker to re-board the bus. He puts Charlene at knifepoint and orders her to drive back to the elementary school. The warehouse door opens again, and Charlene backs the bus out of the building.

SCENE 11: Bus # 846, Interior, Driving

As she resumes driving, Charlene does her best to stay calm. She asks Kamil questions, such as, "Why are you doing this?" and "What is in those containers you put on the bus?" When she gets no response, Charlene asks why they are going to the elementary school. Kamil barks that he will take revenge on hundreds of American infidel children.

SCENE 12: "911 Operator" Center & Daniels Run Elementary School

All of this communication is overheard by the "911" operator. As the actual scenario *(and intent of the hijackers)* becomes clearer, the "911" operator dispatches a SWAT team and bomb-squad to Daniels Run Elementary School. The SWAT team and bomb-squad assigns this mission the highest priority (because a school is involved) and arrive within 7 minutes. With logistic advice from school officials, they set up a defensive containment position about 300 yards before *(away from)* the school *(and also away from the normal bus un-loading zone)*. They wait for Bus # 846 to arrive at the containment zone. The SWAT Team advises Mr. Hopkins to execute his evacuation plan and Mr. Hopkins gives the order to do so.   *(Start Evacuation, then cut back to bus for Scene 13)*

SCENE 13: Bus # 846 Interior, Driving

Charlene spots a patrolling police car and subtly switches on the exterior headlights and depresses the high beam switch *(on the floor)* several times to get the officer's attention. She also switches on ALL exterior lights *(fixed and flashing lights)* on the bus. Kamil does not notice this and cannot see the exterior lights. However, the officer

driving the patrol car notices the unusual light pattern, and also sees that the bus number is # 846. About the same time, he hears a call from the police dispatcher asking units to "be on the lookout" for the bus.

The officer notifies his police dispatch that he has found the bus and gives the location. He is instructed to follow bus # 846 at a safe distance, but is told NOT to try to stop it. Kamil sees the police car, but it does not seem to be approaching the bus…so he tells Charlene to keep driving. The exterior lights of the bus continue to flash for the remainder of the trip, but Kamil does not notice them.

SCENE 14:   Daniels Run Elementary School, Exterior (cut back to Scene 12)

Resume evacuation "interrupted from Scene 12). The children and staff evacuate the school. *(Scene will be filmed while staging a fire drill at an elementary school in Texas).*

SCENE 15:   Bus # 846 Exterior, Driving

As the bus approaches the schools with all lights on and flashing, police cars are positioned waiting at a containment zone. This scene is shot first from the bus exterior, and then shifts to the hijacker's point of view.

SCENE 16: Bus # 846 Interior

Kamil is confused as he observes the "welcoming" defense assets. He was not expecting the reception and it appears unlikely that he can reach his target. He glances around wildly, not quite knowing what to do.   As Kamil surveys his situation, the bus radio *(silent until now)* crackles to life with urgent surrender instructions from the SWAT Team leader. Kamil seems stunned that the radio is "working…"; he mutters something like "…that was supposed to be jammed…"   Charlene stops the bus in the containment zone and shuts off the engine. In a quick movement, she removes the key from the ignition and throws it out of the driver's window to the ground outside the bus. Kamil yells for her to keep driving, but Charlene softly replies, "I can't. The keys are gone"! Kamil is visibly shaken by all of the unexpected developments and he loses his focus.

Kamil considers detonating the bus but realizes his real mission is failing. Destroying the bus would kill only two people (himself and Charlene)…and his failure would be ridiculed among his colleagues. He concludes that the minor damage he would cause was" insignificant", and could lead to retaliation against his family.   He decides to "end it all" and rushes to the rear of the bus to trigger the detonators. He leaves Charlene alone in front of the bus. Charlene throws open the door, allowing two armed members of the SWAT team to enter (with guns drawn). They toss a "flash & stun" grenade ahead of them and move quickly down the aisle of the bus. Kamil (*and Charlene)* are disoriented by the flash.   Before Kamil can explode the bus, he is overcome by the SWAT Team. Kamil is led away in handcuffs and Charlene sinks down on one of the bus seats to recover from her ordeal.   A CNN film crew arrives to film the arrest and interview Mr. Hopkins. The interview begins…

Music matches the ebb and flow of tension across the scenes.

Bus # 846 is disarmed and towed away. The evacuated students return to the school, laughing and giggling, as the apparent "fire-drill "is over. They are unaware of the danger they faced.

Discussion Break # 5   (Optional) for Scenes 13-16

SCENE 17: The "Vacant" Warehouse; 10 Minutes Later

This is a short scene with a police SWAT team storming the warehouse where the explosives were loaded. The remaining terrorists *(i.e., Marvin, Tina and Karl)* are surprised, captured, and the children hostages freed. The scene fades to black.

SCENE 18: On-Camera Narrator

An on-camera narrator wraps up the events just depicted and emphasizes the importance of transportation security programs for public schools. He emphasizes that a properly prepared, though ad-hoc team is strong enough, prepared enough and skillful enough to defeat the most determined terrorist. He also emphasizes, "What could have been" if that team broke down.

He points out that completion of the STSA awareness material is the best way to assure sufficient preparation, strength and teamwork.

Interspersed throughout the DVD are five built-in "discussion break-points".[4] The leader may use these designed break points to pause and review key points made in the respective scene groupings, as indicated in the following paragraphs.

VI.2.b *Discussion Break # 1 – After Scene 3 (10 Minutes)*

Scenes 1-3 depict events related to storage yard security, penetration and protection. The leader might explore

➢ Conditions to be observed and discussed by group participants:
- Value of locks and fences in denying access
- Locked vs. unlocked buses (e.g., deterrent to vandalism?)
- Common vs. individual bus keying – Implications of each
- Value of lighting
- Yard surveillance possibilities and their relative value (e.g. cameras)

➢ Actions to be observed and discussed by group participants:
- Surveillance, investigation and reporting
- Suspicious signs, objects and substances observed
- Recognition of suspicious (and out-of-place) equipment
- "Inter-office" communication and teamwork
- "Do not touch" rule for suspicious objects
- Equipment quarantine as a response
- Pre-trip inspections – for safety and security

---

[4] Discussion break-points occur after Scenes 3, 6, 9,12, 16 and 18 (end)

VI.2.c *Discussion Break # 2 – After Scene 6   (15-20 Minutes)*

Scenes 4-6 depict en-route operations with (and without) suspicious activities at bus stops. The leader might explore

- ➢ Conditions to be observed and discussed by group participants:
    - Circumstances at bus stop observed by driver on approach
    - What is normal (e.g., passengers and conditions)
    - What is not normal (e.g., passengers and conditions)
    - Correlation of clothes with weather conditions (e.g. coats in warm weather)
    - Correlation of passengers and their "luggage" (normal "luggage" carried; backpacks, books etc.)
    - Safety precautions in passenger loading

- ➢ Actions to be observed and discussed by group participants:
    - Bus stop surveillance
    - Defensive approach & options
    - Recognition of suspicious conditions
    - Recognition of suspicious people *(emphasize non-ethnic criteria; e.g., "bad guys" may look just like the rest of us!)*
    - Awareness of environment (e.g., Mrs. Johnson)
    - Practical steps in passenger identification/authentication
    - "Know your passengers; Know your route"
    - Practical steps in denying access to bus
    - Following instructions given by attacker; no "heroics"
    - Ways to signal for help
    - Reassure legitimate passengers
    - Alert police; do not try to replace them
    - Buy time; give "response system" time to form--it will! Trust the response system and do not try to do it all yourself.
    - Think about what is happening and why.
    - Remain calm and steady

VI.2.d *Discussion Break # 3 – After Scene 9   (10 Minutes)*

Scenes 7-9 illustrate some of the "unplanned, un-scripted support team" that begins to form to meet the threat. The leader might point out the diverse nature of this "team" as well as its "ad hoc" nature. There **ARE** resources all around us who will help in their own way, and they should be recognized as such. The discussion is enriched by focusing on these possible sources of help, internal and external to the bus.

Finally, the discussion might focus on practical ways to signal that help is needed. Participants will contribute innovative ideas…the leader should record these ideas and use them in subsequent training sessions with other groups. The leader might explore:

> ➢ Conditions to be observed and discussed by group participants:
> - Available support system components (e.g., people & institutions in community)
> - Means of notification/communication
> - What do they need to know?
> - Involving the community – "ways & means"
> - Use of this DVD material
> - Trust the judgment of other "defenders"; they are smart, creative and eager to do what they can!

VI.2.e *Discussion Break # 4 – After Scene 12   (10 Minutes)*

Scenes 10-12 depict opportunities for "data gathering" to better understand what is really happening, and why. These scenes also emphasize the value of technology *(e.g., cell phones, GPS locators in cell phones, the "911" emergency response network, and other technologies under development, test and evaluation, and improvement by TSA).*

The leader might emphasize the careful gathering of information, and its importance to the overall response. The leader might also review major technology items (above) and their potential role in supporting a true "system" of response.

Finally, the leader can provide realistic information on response times that can be expected in an emergency. Data from the National Association of Chiefs of Police show this to be an average of 7-9 minutes in a metropolitan area for a "priority call"[5]. This information is important to let school transport officials (including drivers) know "how long" they have to defend before they can expect help to arrive.

The leader might point out that the major objective is <u>NOT</u> to negotiate a solution[6] but it <u>IS</u> to "buy time" and learn as much as possible about the plans of the attacker. Then, it is up to the creativity of the driver (i.e., as data-collector) to communicate as much as possible to the external support system without endangering himself/herself.

The leader might also use this discussion break to point out that Charlene's defensive measure with his cell phone might be, in itself, a provocative measure that increases the danger to himself and his student passengers. The viewing group should be cautioned that such measures are not necessarily recommended, unless they can be accomplished without escalating the danger. On the other hand, the group may be reminded that simple compliance with all hijacker instructions may diminish (or eliminate) the ability to defeat the threat in any/all of its dimensions. This trade-off should be discussed, with the conclusion that it is up to the driver's "on-the-ground" judgment to determine how far he/she can safely go. The leader may wish to point out that Charlene's ability to make this judgment will be improved as a result of the STSA training program.

The bus driver should obey instructions of the attacker, but introduce as many "little" frustrations as he/she can in order to disrupt any prior planning by the attacker. If this is impossible, he/she should be instructed to obey commands.

---

[5] A threat against any part of the school transport system is a priority call for the "911" system in the US.
[6] Negotiations with an organized terrorist are usually impossible

VI.2.f *Discussion Break # 5 – After Scene 16 (Optional)   (5 Minutes)*

Good outcomes are possible! Attacker frustration leads to indecision. Indecision at the right time can overwhelm the attackers' careful planning/expectations and defeat the attack. The leader might wish to emphasize the positive outcome and invite discussion among participants of the steps and actions depicted.

The leader might also use this discussion break to point out that Charlene's courageous defensive measures with the bus lights and the ignition keys might, in themselves, be a provocative action that increases the danger to himself. The group should be cautioned that such measures are not necessarily recommended, unless they can be accomplished without escalating the danger. On the other hand, the group may be reminded that simple compliance with all hijacker instructions may diminish (or eliminate) the ability to defeat the threat and its complete consequences. This trade-off should be discussed, with the conclusion that it is up to the driver's "on-the-ground" judgment to determine how far he/she can safely go. The leader may wish to point out that Charlene's ability to make this judgment will be improved as a result of the STSA training program.

VI.3   Post-Viewing Discussion   {Equal to or Less Than 30 Minutes}

At the conclusion of the video viewing, the leader should again point out that Charlene's courageous and aggressive defensive actions might risk the escalation of the danger and are not necessarily recommended. The audience, however, should be reminded that simple compliance with all of the hijackers' commands will only increase their probability of their success. In the end, it is up to Charlene's "on-the-ground" judgment as to how far she can go. The leader might point out that these judgments will be improved as a result of training provided by STSA.

The leader might close the technical discussion by stressing the importance of prompt "after-action" reporting of **ANY** security incident (such as the one observed in the video) to TSA's nationwide "Highway Watch" call-center. Generally, such reports are made by the "emergency responders" involved in the action, but the contact information for "Highway Watch" should be provided to school transportation personnel anyway. The nationwide **"Highway Watch"** telephone number is **1-877-USA-SAFE** or 1-877-872-7233, and it will remain unchanged.

This discussion period concludes with an effectiveness evaluation of the material presented in the DVD (and the individual discussion breaks). The leader should use the Effectiveness Evaluation instrument provided in Attachment 3 to this document to complement open discussion among participants.

VII.   "QUICK PREPARATION" KEY

The audio-visual DVD is intended for presentation to members of the target audience in any of three possible modes, i.e.,

1. Private viewing by an individual participant (1 individual),
2. Private viewing with post-viewing discussion   (2 individuals, in self-study mode w/ limited collegial discussion)
3. Group viewing by 3 to 20 participants at the same time.

The "Quick Preparation Key" of Figure 1 may be helpful in planning, organizing and delivering the material discussed in Sections I through VI, above.

VII.1   Materials Needed

VII.1.a *Private Viewing Mode*   (1 participant[7])

   a.   Digital Video Disc ("*School Transport Security Awareness*")
   b.   DVD Player
   c.   Television Set
   d.   Threat Description   *(Attachment 1)*
   e.   Effectiveness Evaluation Instrument   *(Attachment 3)*

Materials a, d and e will be provided to each participant in DVD or hard-copy form. Access to b and c will be arranged by the leader[8].

VII.1.b *Private Viewing w/ Post-viewing Discussion Mode*   (2 participants)

   a.   Digital Video Disc *("School Transport Security Awareness")*
   b.   DVD Player
   c.   Television Set
   d.   Threat Description (*Attachment 1*)
   e.   Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guide (Optional) (*Attachment 2*)
   f.   Effectiveness Evaluation Instrument (*Attachment 3*)

Materials a, d, e and f will be provided in DVD or hard-copy form. Access to Items b and c will be arranged by the leader.

VII.1.c *Group Viewing Mode w/ Full Discussion* (3 to 20 participants)

   a.   Flip Chart Stand and disposable "Butcher Paper"
   b.   Magic Markers (several colors)
   c.   Digital Video Disc ("*School Transport Security Awareness*")
   d.   DVD Player
   e.   Large Screen Television Set
   f.   Laptop Computer (Optional)
   g.   LCD Projector & Screen (or "white wall" for Power Point Slides (Optional)
   h.   Threat Description copies for each participant (*Attachment 1*)
   i.   Vulnerability Self-Assessment Power Point Slides (Optional) for each participant (*Attachment 2*)
   j.   Effectiveness Evaluation Instrument for each participant (*Attachment 3*)

This mode is the most comprehensive, with significant benefit realized from group interaction. Therefore, it is the recommended delivery mode. It also reaches the widest possible audience in the shortest period of

---

[7] Each participant should be assigned a trainer "mentor" (as physically close as possible, but not necessarily co-located) to assist and consult on any subject matter and/or delivery access questions or difficulties. Electronic consultation is satisfactory.
[8] This may include the use of equipment in the participants' home.

time. The other modes are, of course, shorter and more suited to self-study in any setting, including the home.

VII.2   Lesson Plans - All Delivery Modes

Figure 1 provides a summary flow of the learning experience under each of the three delivery modes outlined above. The times provided for each activity are suggestions only, and may be varied at the discretion of the discussion leader.

Figure 1.

"Learning Experience" Flow
(Duration of Activities Varies at Leader's Discretion

Activity (Icons)	Private Viewing Mode	Private Viewing w/ Discussion	Group Viewing w/ Full Discussion
	Pre-viewing Prep. -7 min.	*Pre-viewing Prep. 12 min*	*Pre-Viewing Phase - 90 min.*
Group			Self-Introductions (Leader & Individual Group Members) – 10 min.
Lecture	STSA Overview -2 min.	STSA Overview -2 min.	STSA Project Overview – 5 min.
Read, Disc	Threat Review - 5 min.	Threat Discussion- 10 min	Threat Discussion 30 min.
Computer			Vulnerability Self-Assessment - 45 min..
			(Optional) –Power Point Slides
Coff. Cup			*Break - 10 min.*
	DVD Viewing - 20 min	*DVD Viewing - 20 min*	*DVD Viewing w/ Discussions - 70 min.*
TV	Play Video – No Pauses	Play Video – No Pauses	Play Video
TV Pause			Video Paused at First Break (*)
Group			Discussion Break # 1 - 10 min.
TV			Resume Video
TV Pause			Video Paused at Second Break (*)
Group			Discussion Break # 2 - 15 min.
TV			Resume Video
TV Pause			Video Paused at Third Break (*)
Group			Discussion Break # 3 - 10 min.
TV			Resume Video
TV Pause			Video Paused at Fourth Break (*)
Group			Discussion Break # 4 - 10 min.
TV			Resume Video
TV Pause			Video Paused at Fifth Break (*)
Group			Discussion Break # 5 - 5 min.
TV	Stop Video @ Conclusion	Stop Video @ Conclusion	Resume Video to Conclusion
Document	*Post-Viewing Effectiveness Evaluation - 5 min.*	*Post-Viewing Discussion & Effectiveness Evaluation - 30 min*	*Post-Viewing Discussion & Effectiveness Evaluation - 30 min*
	Session Adjourn - (32 min.)	*Session Adjourns – (62 min)*	*Session Adjourns - (3 hrs & 20 min)*
Clock	*Half-Hour Program*	*One-Hour Program*	*Half-Day Program (**)*

*   "Fade to black" frames provide visual cues to leader for appropriate "pause" points
**   If Vulnerability Self-Assessment instrument is used

ATTACHMENT 1
THREAT DESCRIPTION

THE THREAT

International Terrorism

Twenty five million children ride 500,000 school buses each day throughout the United States.   These children come from virtually every family, in every region of the country, and in every urban and rural setting. A security threat directed against any part of this transportation segment would have enormous consequences not only to the individual victims and families involved, but also to the rest of the country as confidence in the ability of national, state and local governments to protect its citizens is shaken.

Unlike the charter bus industry, the operational model of the school bus transportation system is consistent with, and similar to "regular line runs" or metropolitan transit systems. Movements are routine, predictable and thus extremely vulnerable to determined terrorist observation, planning, rehearsal and attack.

World events show that international terrorists make no distinction between military and civilian targets as a means to emphasize and promote their agenda, and they have shown both the willingness and the capacity to include children and schools in their target list[9]. The local, national and world-wide consequences have been severe and lasting.

Individual school buses (or groups of school buses) are vulnerable to direct attack by suicide bombers, by remotely detonated devices (e.g. Improvised Explosive Devices), by disbursal of harmful chemical or biological substances and by hijacking with or without hostage taking (under associated media coverage).

Beyond direct attacks against specific school transport vehicles and their human "cargo", school buses enjoy normal, frequent and unquestioned access to destinations of national significance (i.e. schools, national monuments, public buildings, public gatherings etc.). If "converted" into an explosive, chemical, biological or radiological weapon[10], they are capable of enormous mass destruction and loss-of-life, with little or no warning.

Organized attacks by international terrorists may occur against a single school transport vehicle; or may involve multiple vehicles in combination. These targets may or may not be otherwise connected. Nevertheless, combined and coordinated attacks carry added potential for disruption of our way of life.

Domestic Terrorism

In addition to vulnerability from international terrorists, the school transportation system faces threats from "within". The United States has experienced incidents of criminal terrorism, sometimes performed by otherwise legitimate students against their fellow classmates[11]. These attacks include some form of hijacking, robbery, gang activity, coercion and/or intimidating acts against individual students.

While less "cosmic" than acts by international terrorists, these vulnerabilities must be faced and defeated with equal effectiveness in order to preserve and protect our citizens' safety and security in their daily lives.

---

9 Beslan School attack in Russia September, 2004, Afghanistan school attack in September 2004, etc.
10 Similar to the "conversion" of commercial airplanes in the attacks of 11 September, 2001
11 Columbine student-on-student attack.

POTENTIAL TARGETS – SECURITY AWARENESS TRAINING

In defending against the vulnerabilities above, school transportation system personnel (national, state and local) must be adequately trained in security awareness to protect the following assets from seizure and/or destruction by unauthorized individuals/groups at all times of the day or night, and on every day of the year:

> ➢ Buses (occupied or non-occupied)
> ➢ Bus Drivers
> ➢ Bus Passengers (e.g., students and approved passengers accompanying students)
> ➢ Bus Monitors (e.g. faculty and other school district officials)
> ➢ Bus "Luggage" or legitimate equipment carried
> ➢ School Bus Destinations
> ➢ School Transport Facilities (e.g. bus parking yards, dispatch/communications/control centers, storage barns, maintenance facilities, etc.)
> ➢ School Facilities (e.g. school buildings, athletic fields etc. – indoor/outdoor)
> ➢ School Personnel (e.g. Faculty, Staff, Administration, Maintenance personnel)

ATTACK MODES – SECURITY AWARENESS TRAINING

Security awareness training must include preparation for the following attack modes:

> ➢ Hijacking
> ➢ Hostage Taking
> ➢ Theft of Assets (e.g. vehicles)
> ➢ Conversion of Bus(es) into Weapons of Mass Destruction (Tampering)
> > Explosive
> > Chemical
> > Biological
> > Radiological
> ➢ On-board or Remote Destruction of Bus and/or its Passengers
> ➢ Criminal Attacks on Passengers (e.g. Robbery, Assault, Intimidation, Abuse)

"EXTERIOR THREAT"

School bus operations routinely place drivers in a position (and in locations) to observe potential threats to the larger highway/transportation infrastructure. The Transportation Security Administration has created a nationwide program stretching across all forms of motor transport[12] and school districts must be made aware of effective ways and means of benefiting from this larger program, and in communicating and coordinating with it.

Specific training in the observation and reporting of suspicious behavior will not be repeated under the School Transportation Security Awareness Training program…but awareness, contribution, and communications linkage to the Highway Watch program (and "School Bus Watch" program) will be included as an important part of STSA security training materials for consistency and completeness.

---

[12] "Highway Watch", administered by the American Trucking Associations and "School Bus Watch"

CRISIS RESPONSE & COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Separate from specific "interior" or "exterior" attacks above, school transportation officials may be called upon to assist in other national emergencies or natural disaster responses[13]. The STSA security training materials will address the initial steps necessary for effective crisis support, including contact with FEMA to determine the depth, breadth and timing of support possible.

CONCLUSION: School Transportation Security Awareness Training under the current STSA security program will be limited to the threats, targets and attack modes described in this Specification. Additional threat dimensions and attack scenarios will be referred to the Transportation Security Administration of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for analysis, response and possible incorporation into subsequent editions of STSA security training materials.

---

[13] E.g. Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans / Gulf Coast and similar natural disasters.

ATTACHMENT 2

SECURITY PREPAREDNESS SELF-ASSESSMENT GUIDE FOR
SCHOOL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

Developed Under the
School Transportation Security Awareness (STSA) Training Program
In Conjunction with the National Association for Pupil Transportation (NAPT)[14]

The training program you are about to undertake describes the security environment facing school transportation systems across the United States as the nation prosecutes the "War on Terror". President George W. Bush correctly reminds the country that this effort will last a long time, and that we may never return to the post-Cold War calm that existed before the 1993 outbreak of terrorism in the US.

Before embarking on the audio-visual and Internet training of STSA, it is instructive to examine the security preparedness of your school transportation network as it exists today. In order to help accomplish this self-examination, a detailed series of sixty-one (61) questions has been derived covering all aspects of pupil transportation operations and management; these questions are presented in Table 1 of this Attachment.

These questions can each be answered with a simple "Yes" or "No" response. They do not address every circumstance, but instead are designed to stimulate thought about preparedness (or, conversely, vulnerabilities) of each school district's own operations. Even if all questions can be answered in the affirmative, this does not guarantee that a given system will be attack-free…but affirmative completion does assure that a school transportation system has taken all reasonable steps in planning, training, observation, communication, command and control, and practice to deter attack, and to recover if prevention should fail.

The questions have been designed for completion by the school district itself *(with no outside assistance required)* in about 30 minutes[15]. Each "Yes" or "No" response[16] is accompanied by a pre-set weighting factor that indicates the relative importance to security preparedness[17]. The overall security preparedness "score" is determined by multiplying these two factors and summing responses over all of the questions. The higher the total, the better prepared a school transportation system is to deal with security threats. If this process suggests corrective action, the relative sensitivity (or leverage) of the corrective action is shown by the weighting factor.

Of course, the questions may be answered any number of times, and at different intervals to measure and record growth in security preparedness over time. This is especially appropriate to measure and report "gains" achieved as a result of the STSA training itself.

At the end of the process, a school transportation system can be assured that it has "hardened" itself as much as possible *(or practical)*, and that it has a blueprint against which to measure future policy, practice, procedure or technology initiatives.

---

[14] Used by Permission of NAPT; detailed information may be found at www.napt.org under Course No. 901
[15] Estimate does not include "data collection" time
[16] A "Yes" is signified by a "1"; and a "No" is signified by a "0" in the "Entrée" column.
[17] A "weighting factor of "3" indicates a high importance; and a weighting factor of "1" indicates lesser importance to increasing security preparedness, or decreasing vulnerability.

Table 1: STSA SECURITY PREPAREDNESS SELF-ASSESSMENT GUIDE

Security Preparedness Category	*Importance Factor* (1=L; 3=H)	*"Yes or No" Entrée* (Yes=1; No=0)	*Preparedness "Points"* (Col. C x Col. D)
Category I. Administrative Structure			
1. Is my school willing to take an active role in preventing and/or defeating terrorism?	3	1	3
2. Do my "direct reports" know of this willingness?	3	1	3
3. Do they share my commitment?	3		0
4. Is this willingness communicated in writing *(in any form; e.g., policy, procedures etc.)*	1		0
5. Do I (we) have a security team *(or personnel, staff)* in place?	2		0
6. Is it formally chartered and/or codified in "job descriptions"?	1		0
7. Can all security team personnel or staff be reached "24/7"?	3		0
8. Can all security team personnel or staff reach me "24/7"?	3		0
9. Does the security team/staff monitor threat data? *(as a group? Individually?)*	3		0
10. Does the security team/staff meet w/ state & local law enforcement? (annually)	1		0
11. Does the security team/staff meet w/emergency responders?	1		0
12. Does the security team/staff perform occasional vulnerability audits of operations?	3		0
13. Does a written "risk analysis" exist *(i.e. for events involving school assets)*?	3		0
14. Has the "risk analysis" been discussed with outside law enforcement and/or emergency responders?	1		0
15. Does security team practice response to threat scenarios?	3		0
16. Does the school maintain a list of emergency names, telephone numbers, FAX and e-mail addresses for federal, state and local first-responders?	3		0
17. Is this list kept up to date?	3		0
18. Is this list accessible within 5 minutes?	3		0
19. Is there a systematic process and/or procedure for locating transportation assets if an event occurs?	2		0
20. Can school management establish any form of communication with its assets if an event occurs?	3		0
21. Is there a communication plan for contacting federal, state or local authorities if an event occurs?	3		0
22. Does the school provide and/or receive security awareness training? Basic & Refresher training?	3		0
23. Does each employee know what behavior is expected of him/her during a crisis?	2		0

Category II - Personnel Information   (For Hiring Managers)

24. Does a complete, accurate and up-to-date list of all school employees exist?	3	0
25. Does the school maintain emergency contact information on all employees?	3	0
26. Have all employee's identities been checked/verified?	3	0
27. Are criminal background checks performed for employees in security-sensitive positions?	3	0
28. Is US citizenship verified for applicable employees?	3	0
29. Do any employees have access clearances or credentials (e.g.ID badges) to transportation facilities?	2	0
30. Are these clearances periodically review to re-establish continued need?	2	0
31. If anything suspicious arises in a background investigation is there a process to follow?	3	0
32. Are safeguards in place to avoid violation of civil liberties?	3	0
33. Do personnel have opportunity for discovery, explanation and challenge of unfavorable information?	3	0

Category III - Personnel Training & En Route Operations   (For Human Resources Unit)

34. Have school personnel received any training in security sensitivity?	3	0
35. Have school personnel received any training in threat possibilities?	3	0
36. Have school personnel received training in the following:		
Employee responsibilities?	3	0
Organizational security structure?	3	0
Security support infrastructure?	3	0
37. Are vehicles provided with any position locating and reporting mechanisms? Official or personal?	3	0

Category IV - Facility/Terminal Security   (For Facilities Manager)

38. Does the school have a security plan for each of its facilities? e.g. "lock-down", quarantine, evacuation	3	0
39. Have law enforcement officials reviewed the company's facility security plans?	2	0
40. Are security guards used during normal working hours?	1	0
41. Are there "mail room" security procedures in use? (e.g., Postal Service Guidelines)	1	0

"The Yard"

42. Is there fencing around the school's transportation facilities?	1	0
43. Are fences well maintained?	1	0
44. Are surveillance cameras, access control devices, alarm systems etc. in use?	3	0

45. Are such devices regularly checked for proper operation?	3		0
46. Is the lighting adequate for security?	2		0
47. Is access restricted to a single gate, or point-of-entry/exit?	2		0
48. Are there restrictions on visitor access?	3		0
49. Are visitors escorted by a school employee when on the facility?	3		0
"The Vehicles"			
50. Are all keys signed out, with records kept of their assignment?	3		0
51. Is each vehicle separately and individually "keyed"?	3		0
52. Are all vehicles locked when not in use?	3		0
53. Are all locks tamper proof, or tamper-evident?	2		0
54. Are records kept of suspected security incidents?	3		0
"The Building Space"			
55. Do facility managers know how (and to whom) to report suspicious activity/incidents/equipment/packages?	3		0
56. Do facility managers know expected response times for external emergency responders?	2		0
57. Has this response ever been measured in a "drill"?	2		0
58. Are facility employees knowledgeable and trained in facility security procedures?	3		0
Category VI - General Emergency Response Preparedness			
59. Does the school have an emergency plan for stolen assets or incidents involving a company vehicle?	3		0
60. Does the school ever conduct drills or "table-top" exercises for threats against company assets?	3		0
61. Does the school conduct formal analyses of drill results?	3		0

Security Preparedness "Points" - *(Maximum Possible = 160)*   6

ATTACHMENT 3

SCHOOL TRANSPORTION SECURITY AWARENESS TRAINING
EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION INSTRUMENT

AUDIO-VISUAL PRESENTATION SEGMENT

Please complete the following table by assigning "letter grades" that best describes how effective the audio-visual presentation material (and discussions) was in satisfying the individual learning objectives listed in Column 1. The "grading scale" is identical to a "4 point grading system", where A= Excellent; B= Good, C= Fair; D=Poor; and F=Failure.

Also, provide any verbal comments or suggestions you feel would help improve this effectiveness.

"Effectiveness Grade"

Learning Objective	A	B	C	D	F
	(4 Pts)	(3 Pts.)	(2 Pts.)	(1 Pt.)	(0 Pts.)
1. Understand & recognize security vulnerabilities					
2. Identify reasonable protective measures					
3. Understand & define consequences of inaction					
4. Recognize potential for mass casualties					
5. Achieve capability & will to act					
6. Endorse security awareness programs					
7. Promote implementation of security management					
8. Recognize importance of teamwork					

Date of Viewing Session: _____

Location of Viewing Session: _____

Participant Name (optional): _____

Position/Job Title (optional) _____

Comments and Suggestions for improvement: _____
_____
_____
_____
_____